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The prospects for foreign debt sustainability in post-completion point countries:
implications for the HIPC-MDRI framework
In September 1999, calls for a comprehensive approach to address the excessive external debt burden of the world's poorest states culminated in the revision of the original Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative framework. It then became known as the "Enhanced HIPC Initiative" (HIPC II). The HIPC II Initiative was expected to benefit around forty low-income countries, of which twenty-two had reached their Completion Point and had started to receive irrevocable debt relief by April 20071. Compared with the original HIPC I, the enhanced initiative established a stronger link between debt relief and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)(I have added this -should it be here?) by making relief conditional on the progress made by qualifying countries in the preparation and implementation of social policies and strategies for reducing poverty.
An important milestone in the history of debt relief programmes was the launch of the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) in July 2005 by the leaders of the group of G-8 countries at their summit in Gleneagles in Scotland. Under this proposal, countries that had reached, or would eventually reach the Completion Point under the HIPC II Initiative would receive 100 percent debt cancellation from three multilateral institutions, the IMF, the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank and the African Development Fund (AfDF) of the African Development Bank. The full write-off covered the debts owed to each institution at the end of 2004. By the end of January 2006 there was an agreement by the Executive Board of the IMF, the IDA and the AfDF that seventeen post-completion point HIPCs had met the policy qualification criteria and should be provided with MDRI relief.
Unlike the HIPC Initiative and numerous traditional debt relief programmes before it, the MDRI was not based on the principle of proportional burden sharing on the part of official bilateral or of private creditors, or of other multilateral agencies beyond the three selected institutions. Nonetheless, in January 2007 the Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) agreed to extend similar assistance to their qualifying member states, even though they were not included in the original G-8 proposal. Bolivia, Guyana, Honduras and Nicaragua are four countries that have now qualified to receive MDRI assistance from the IADB.
But in recent years, the HIPC II-MDRI has been subjected to criticism, in particular with respect to its choice of the debt indicators available for judging sustainability and treatment of domestic debt. Despite the reservations of several authors, notably Peter Hjertholm (2003) , our analysis nevertheless takes as given the indicators of debt sustainability as defined by the sponsors of the HIPC II Initiative. There is some merit in using the IMF-World Bank debt sustainability framework, if only for comparison of outcome purposes. Even so, the results of debt sustainability analyses under the current HIPC II Framework should be interpreted with caution.
This is particularly the case in many South and Central American countries where the inclusion of government domestic debt in the overall liabilities of the public sector could lead to a markedly different classification of debt distress.
The objectives of this paper, then, are threefold:
First, it assesses the impact of Enhanced HIPC-MDRI financing on the external debt of those post-HIPC countries that qualified for MDRI assistance by the end of January 2006. These economies included: Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambiasixteen in all. The study excludes Guyana because its exports plus imports were outlying at 180 percent of GDP averaged from 1980 to 2004. This was roughly four times the corresponding average ratio of trade to GDP for the group of seventeen economies classified as heavily indebted in the World Bank Development Indicators for 2006. Moreover, data showed that domestic debt as a proportion of GDP in Guyana was considerably higher than in the other post-HIPC countries included in our sample.
Second, we investigate the interrelationship between key indicators of macroeconomic management and projected external debt levels in countries that met the policy qualification criteria for MDRI assistance by the end January 2006. We utilize a simple growth-with-debt model that is capable of demonstrating the effect of major structural policy variables on the evolution of external debt obligations in borrowing countries. The results may contribute to the continued debate for a re-enhanced front-loading of future debt relief to HIPC countries with "good" policies in support of the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). (is this technically the 2nd time it is mentioned?)
Third, in the past in many HIPCs, the failure to persist with the set of complex IMF and World Bank macroeconomic stabilisation and structural policies contributed to the build-up of external liabilities to unsustainable levels. This paper highlights the impact of such slippages in policy reforms on indebtedness in post-HIPC countries and suggests policy actions for achieving and maintaining long-term debt sustainability beyond the delivery of MDRI relief assistance.
The article is organised as follows: Section 1 specifies the growth-with-debt model and associated key parameter values to be used in our baseline simulation of the indicators of foreign borrowing commitment. Section 2 relates this basic growth-debt framework to each of the sixteen post-HIPC-MDRI economies in our sample over the perspective-plan period 2005 to 2030. Section 3 focuses on the implementation of Enhanced HIPC-MDRI programmes. It looks at the extent to which a full cancellation of all multilateral debt stock outstanding at the end of 2004 provides a basis for post-HIPC states to achieve and maintain sustainable debt levels over the medium and long-terms. Section 4 presents sensitivity tests in order to assess the impact of possible failure in the implementation of structural adjustment on the external debt sustainability outlook of our sixteen post-HIPC countries and to qualify our basic optimistic stylized assumptions.
Model Specification and Data Description
The framework underlying our external debt-with-growth simulations in this study is the original Chenery-Strout (1966) dual-gap theoretical model which, despite numerous criticisms, remains the basis of much of the debt sustainability analyses performed by the staff of the World Bank and the IMF. The objections to such traditional financing-gap models has centered mainly on Lucas' (1976) argument that structural relationships predicted by conventional financing-gap methods across random shifts in policy regimes could be highly unstable. Further, in a critical assessment of financing-gap models, William Easterly (1997) noted that financing-gap calculations themselves created perverse incentives since a country's domestic savings performance may well deteriorate following a commitment by donors of more external funds. Under these circumstances, the parameter values underlying the financing-gap methodology might vary substantially from simulations which embody slippage in the implementation of reforms (Easterly, 2006) . The implications for external debt sustainability outlook in post-HIPC-MDRI countries of exogenous shocks in economic fundamentals are explored in Section 4.
A set of tables available from the author, but not given here, report the values of the principal variables to be used in our baseline projections for the stock of foreign loans implied by a target growth in real gross domestic product of five-and-a-half percent 2 . The more than five-percent growth in GDP is needed to prevent an increase in poverty levels, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) by 2015 (World Bank a, 2000) . To remain consistent with this target growth rate, the parameters underlying our simulations have been arbitrarily selected so as to ensure that the dual gap model requirements for a steady downward trend in the gross domestic saving and foreign exchange gaps are obtained in each of our countries.
The marginal rate of savings is projected to rise from a low level of about 6 percent of GDP and then to level off at a constant figure of between 26 and 29 percent by the year 2030. This peak ratio of savings to GDP is comparable to the general level currently obtaining in the more rapidly advancing countries of East Asia. The implications for external debt accumulation of the rather optimistic assumption that the less populous agricultural African HIPCs, such as Benin, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda, will achieve these comparatively high savings to GDP ratios of between 26 and 29 percent of GDP in the twenty-five years from 2005 to 2030 are explored further in our sensitivity tests in Section 4.
We also presume that the projected marginal import rate will first rise slowly from an initial ratio of 15 percent of GDP in 2004 and then level off at between 30 and 33 percent in the year 2030 and beyond. The implicit assumption here is that the agriculture and manufacturing sectors should by then be producing some of what is currently being imported, such as food and other consumer items like clothing and shoes. This could result in a decline in the marginal propensity to import and we have assumed a perhaps optimistic one-to-one relationship between output growth and imports of goods and non-factors services beginning from 2030.
Furthermore, the real rate of growth of exports of goods and non-factor services is expected to rise from a figure which is generally below 4 percent to reach its peak of between 7 and 10 percent in the year 2030. It is then expected to decline slowly from 2031 and to level off at a constant figure equal to the target growth rate in GDP of five-and-a-half percent.
As noted by Avramovic (1964) , McDonald (1982) and Nissanke and Ferrarini (2001) , a successful progression through the external debt-cycle model requires that the projected marginal domestic savings rate should exceed the fixed investment ratio required by the target rate of growth. This should ensure that debt eventually begins to decline. Other long-term debt sustainability provisions subsumed in our baseline growth-with-debt model include the requirement that the anticipated rate of growth of imports should not be more than the real growth rate of exports. We also assume that the estimated growth of external debt and interest payments does not continuously exceed the real rate of growth of exports and income, as well as a need for the marginal product of foreign capital to be greater than the international cost of borrowing. It is against such ambitious sustainability threshold values that the authenticity of the results of our projections for indicators of foreign indebtedness in the sixteen post-HIPC-MDRI countries of study will need to be judged.
Following Feder (1980) 
The External Debt Sustainability Analysis of Post-HIPC-MDRI Countries
The purpose of this section is to justify the discussion of the challenges of maintaining long-term debt sustainability in post-HIPC-MDRI countries by highlighting the linkages between the key determinants of external indebtedness. Analytically, the sustainability of a country's external debt position depends on three main factors and on their development over time. They are: (i) the existing stock of debt outstanding at a given time period t, (ii) the prospective volume and terms of new external borrowing and (iii) the development of fiscal and external repayment capacity. This last is closely related to the outlook for a country's gross domestic output and export growth rates with domestic savings therefrom.
An assessment of external debt sustainability in our sample of post-HIPCs in this paper will involve two measures of external obligations. They are (i) the nominal stock of foreign loans expressed in constant US dollars and (ii) the dollar stock of debt outstanding measured in terms of net present value. However, to account for the effect of growth in the fiscal and repayment capacity of the borrowing countries, these measures of debt burden have been related to development in domestic output and export earnings. Of course, the usefulness of these estimates of debt-to-export ratios, particularly as indicators of debt sustainability, will ultimately depend on the availability of their foreign exchange earnings to a government and on the degree of openness of the economy. For ease of exposition, our discussion and representation are limited to the trend in the unweighted mean for our group of sixteen post-HIPC-MDRI Interestingly, our simulations show that the foreign debt stock expressed as the ratio of previous three-year average GDPs for Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda are likely to fall to below 100 percent by the end of the MDGs in 2015. However these external financing projections are typically ambitious. Any delay in disbursements due to absorption problems in recipient countries or to bureaucracy and administrative difficulties on the part of the creditors may substantially raise the projected debt-stock to GDP ratio. By contrast, the external debt outlook in Ghana, Madagascar, Nicaragua and Zambia is projected to worsen throughout our planning period. Their potential ratios of debt-to-GDP were persistently higher than the comparable mean for our group of sixteen post-HIPCs. This is in spite of our stylized assumption of the countries' continuing good record of satisfactory performance on IMF structural adjustment programs and the implementation of the poverty reduction strategies subsumed in our optimistic parameters. However, we projected that by the end of the planning period in 2030, the external debt stock for our group of HIPCs will decline somewhat to reach 260 percent of export earnings (equivalent to US$13 billion). This is still more the 150 percent of the export sustainability benchmark. But, despite the elevated foreign debt ratios in the early stages of the growth-debt cycle, the potential mean NPV of external debt stock for our group of sixteen post-HIPCs is expected to fall to the sustainability threshold of 150 percent of exports in 2047. We can therefore foresee a time in the future when these HIPCs will be able to meet their debt service commitments from their own export earnings. Nevertheless, there is concern that the heavy external loan burden obtaining in many HIPC economies at the start of their development process may put off potential domestic and foreign investors. Prospective private investors may be worried that a government might finance its onerous debt-servicing obligations through distortionary policies such as the increasing of the domestic money supply and higher taxes. In addition some authors, including Corden (1989) , have argued that high levels of external debt may discourage governments from undertaking difficult reforms, like the trade liberalisation and fiscal adjustments subsumed in our optimistic baseline performance parameters. It follows that as the financial position of these countries improves with structural adjustment, they will almost inevitably come under increasing pressure from foreign creditors to repay their large stock of loans in their entirety. This means that the anticipated effect on economic growth of high external indebtedness in the early stages of the debt-cycle in some HIPCs, such as Ghana, Madagascar, Nicaragua and Zambia, may not only be via a lower than expected volume of investment, but also through a poorer policy environment which will affect the efficiency of physical and human capital.
MDRI Debt Relief and the External Indebtedness of Post-HIPCs
The focus of this section is to examine the impact of the newly proposed MDRI relief on the overall stock of the external debt burden in our sixteen post-HIPCs that qualified for assistance The growth-with-debt identities in equations 1.1 to 1.8 outlined earlier in Section 1 show that a high level of existing stock of debt and associated debt services is one of the major determinants of debt distress in many low-income countries. The Enhanced HIPC Initiative with the supplementary MDRI relief was designed primarily to achieve and maintain sustainable external debt levels in the medium to long-term by providing a one-off stock-of-debt cancellation for qualifying countries. proposed multilateral debt relief on debt sustainability outlook in our sample of HIPCs, it seems, is only a marginal three final years. This implied benefit of a one-off MDRI debt relief is particularly insignificant if the resources saved in these last three years are discounted to the base year 2004. We may therefore infer that the outlook for long-run growth and debt sustainability in those post-HIPCs that failed to qualify for a 100 percent cancellation of their multilateral debt stock outstanding in 2004 will not be significantly different from that of our sample of sixteen states which did qualify in January 2006. This observation is, of course, predicated on the assumption that those post HIPCs that did not qualify for additional assistance under the MDRI arrangement will continue to stay with their economic stabilization programmes and structural reform in a manner similar to that subsumed in our base case scenario. Such further underscores the importance of improvements in policy and institutional environments in attaining and maintaining sustainable external debt levels in the medium to long-term in HIPCs.
Interestingly, the rapid build-up in the overall external debt burden to unsustainable levels of more than 150 percent from 2013 for our sample of the post-HIPCs, despite any MDRI debt relief operation in the early stages of their growth process, is not as an assumed result of the poor economic management that has plagued these economies in the past. After all, our baseline projections are based on optimistic growth-enhancing policy reforms that should augment fiscal balances as well as expand and diversify export production. Rather, the anticipated sharp rise in foreign debt-to-average export ratios is largely due to their continuing requirement for total new external disbursements, 
Adverse Shocks and the Enhanced HIPC-MDRI Framework: A Sensitivity Analysis
The projections in Figure 3 To gain a clearer understanding of the implications of these exogenous factors and less optimistic assumptions for the current Enhanced HIPC-MDRI debt sustainability framework, we conducted sensitivity analyses of the underlying determinants of the evolution of external indebtedness in each of the sixteen post-HIPCs in our study. Specifically, we recalculated the respective NPV of the foreign stock of loans resulting from a ten-percent adverse movement in the following key indicators of debt sustainability: (i) the marginal gross domestic savings rate,
(ii) the real rate of growth in exports, (iii) the share of non-debt creating flows in gross external resources, (iv) the share of multilateral debt in new external disbursements, (v) the share of concessionary loans in new external borrowings, (vi) the interest rate on concessionary and non-concessionary loans and (vii) the grant element in new foreign disbursements. Assessment of a country's vulnerability to these selected exogenous shocks is based on a comparison of the updated foreign debt stock indicators with the measures of debt burden projected under the base case assumption of sound macroeconomic policies and a favourable external environment. Figure 4 presents the results of our sensitivity analyses of the unweighted average percentage change in the NPV of the stock foreign loans for our sample of sixteen HIPCs as whole. The graphical representation and the discussion which follows are for the base case growth-withdebt process without the delivery of MDRI debt relief. This is because our simulations show that there was little difference in projection outcomes with or without the delivery of multilateral debt relief at the end of 2004. Moreover, the promised MDRI assistance is conditional upon the reforms which underlie our baseline scenario. Therefore, sensitivity tests which presume any slippage in policy reforms leading to an adverse movement in the baseline parameter values violates the terms under which MDRI relief was provided to our post-HIPCs.
The key findings of our basecase sensitivity tests may then be summarised as follows:
First, a reduction in the baseline marginal rate of domestic savings by ten-percent annually over the period 2005 to 2030 is likely to be associated with a rise of more than ten-percent of the corresponding baseline NPV debt to GDP figure for our sixteen post-HIPCs as a whole. We estimate that our sample of HIPCs will experience an average annual increase of 29 percent in their unweighted mean ratio of the NPV of debt-to-GDP following a ten-percent reduction in their marginal savings rates over the period 2005 to 2030. Figure 4 shows that this anticipated increase in external debt stock is higher than the effect of a ten-percent reduction in the other key indicators of domestic policy and external environment. Such an outcome further emphasises the importance of the need for HIPCs to take action to improve their savings performance by reducing fiscal deficits, as well as by liberalizing their financial sectors. 
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However, this aggregate result masks significant variation in the vulnerability of our countries individually to a fall in the marginal savings rate. At one end, Ghana and Nicaragua with an annual increase in NPV of debt-to-GDP of 14 and 19 percent respectively are the two least sensitive countries in our sample. At the other extreme, an estimated annual average increase in the NPV of debt-to-GDP ratio of up to, or more than four times the original ten-percent reduction in the marginal domestic savings rate is obtained for Mali, Uganda and Mozambique. This is partly a reflection of the fact that the proposed ten-percent reduction in the domestic savings rate will reduce the annual average for this figure to well below the required ratio of fixed investment to GDP of almost 20 percent implied by the target growth rate of five-and-a-half percent. We therefore project that around one-half of the additional gross resource requirements will be financed from new foreign loans with consequent increases in the outstanding stock of debt.
Second, a ten-percent cut in annual export earnings averaged from 2005 to 2030 will be related to a 22 percent increase in the projected mean ratio of NPV of debt-to-GDP for our sixteen postHIPCs as a whole (see Figure 4) . The ten countries in our sample most at risk to any adverse shock in exports named in ascending order of their vulnerabilities are: Madagascar, Bolivia, Niger, Honduras, Tanzania, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Uganda and Mozambique. We may note, however, that inspite of its high susceptibility to adverse trading shocks, the ratio of the NPV of debt stock to GDP for Mozambique is projected to remain at 28 percent vis-à-vis the mean ratio of 71 percent observed for a group of sixteen post-HIPCs. Mozambique appears to be in a good position to maintain sustainable debt levels despite any worsening of its exports. It is also noteworthy that between 2001 and 2004 , that country actually achieved a real export growth rate of 26 percent per annum following the coming into production of its aluminum project and as a consequence of the ending of its civil war. Such enhancement in its export production should help improve its debt sustainability outlook.
Third, results in Figure 4 reveal that a ten-percent reduction in the average grant element of new external borrowing is likely to lead to an increase of just under 16 percent in the mean NPV of debt-to-average GDP for our sixteen post-HIPC countries as a whole. Countries which are particularly vulnerable to reductions in the level of concessionality in new foreign disbursements are in ascending order: Mali, Mozambique and Rwanda. However, despite the anticipated adverse effect of a lowering in the aid component of new loans to these three economies, our results suggest that their potential NPV of foreign debt stock will endure at below the HIPC II threshold of 40 percent of average GDP. This suggests that not every HIPC country which experiences a rise in its NPV of external debt stock will face a fundamental worsening in its debt sustainability outlook. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasise that our baseline projections are tentative as they are derived from simulation exercises and depend critically on the underlying stylized assumptions. One such conjecture is that all creditors are willing to engage in defensive lending by rolling over their outstanding claims as they fall due. Additionally, they are presumed to be content to continue to provide new financing to help HIPCs fill the larger of their investment minus savings or foreign exchange gaps and to cover debt service payments on the terms and conditions that prevailed from 1990 to 2004. But the outlook for the global capital market is uncertain, as are our estimates of the indicators of debt stock which they determine.
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
The high indebtedness of world's poorest countries has been recognised as an important problem which needs to be resolved if they are to achieve their MDGs by 2015. In this paper we have addressed concerns regarding whether the current HIPC-MDRI framework will be able to assist in reaching and maintaining long-term external debt sustainability in sixteen out of the seventeen countries that met the policy eligibility criteria of the MDRI Program in January 2006.
The main findings and consequent policy options may be summarised as follows:
First, it is unlikely that any of our sixteen post-HIPCs will reach a stage in the next two and a half decades at which they can afford to pay out of their own domestic savings (or foreign exchange receipts) for all the investment, imports and debt servicing required to achieve and sustain the annual growth in real gross domestic product needed to meet both the United Nations MDGs by 2015 and the HIPC II debt sustainability thresholds. This is in spite of the fact that, under our Third, the results of our sensitivity analysis suggest that policy initiatives which address the problems faced by post-HIPC-MDRI countries in terms of a low marginal savings rate would be most effective in helping them to reach and maintain sustainable external debt levels. As part of a well-designed strategy to raise aggregate domestic savings rates, HIPC governments should improve transparency in their collection, reporting and management of public resources.
They should also remove subsidies and deregulate prices to provide user charges which cover the cost for public utilities. Admittedly, however, the implementation of the foregoing fiscal adjustment policies, while beneficial in the long term, could adversely affect the lower income sections of society and lead to an initial rise in poverty levels. But the financial cost of avoiding such difficult reforms bearing on the low domestic savings rate in many HIPCs may be high in terms of required new disbursements from abroad. The willingness of donors to provide the additional resources for financing such projected increases in new borrowing arising from a widening in fiscal deficits in particular is uncertain.
Fourth, equally important in the maintenance of sustainable debt levels in post-HIPC countries, as suggested by our sensitivity tests, is the growth of exports. To reduce their vulnerability to external trading conditions, HIPC countries should expand the share of exports in their gross domestic products. Appropriate export expansion policies require that HIPC governments address problems relating to the poor quality of infrastructure, especially where it specifically bears upon the cost of production and transport of goods. These facilities include roads and railways, power, telecommunication, ports and airports in particular. Also, they should take action to remove impediments to private sector development, notably in those areas which relate to the earning of foreign exchange. These constraints may include the limited availability of skills and capital for entrepreneurs, as well as price regulation, corruption and bureaucracy, an absence of law and order and a poor protection of property. Improvements therein should attract foreign direct investment and strengthen the responsiveness of export supplies to trading opportunities in the world market. Of course these concerns also bear upon production as a whole, but they are particularly significant where the exigencies of a competitive world export markets are concerned. In addition, the HIPC authorities should liberalize their exchange rate regimes and trade policies by abolishing destructive publicly-owned marketing boards, cutting taxes and other restrictions on exports, as well as by improving transparency in customs procedures, border controls and police harassment. To encourage diversification, small and medium scale exporters of manufactured goods and non-traditional agricultural products, such as cut-flowers, medicinal plants and exotic fruit and vegetables, should, perhaps, be given dutyfree access to imported inputs including seeds, fertilizers, capital machinery and spare parts.
Regional market integration and monetary unions would also allow small sized countries to take advantage of economies of scale and so to improve export competitiveness. Donor governments, for their part, should reduce barriers to, and within their markets, including agricultural subsidies. By insulating their farmers from swings in world prices, trade-distorting subsidies are reputed to have contributed to debt distress in HIPCs by exacerbating volatility in commodity prices. They should also improve access to their markets by allowing duty and quota free entry of imports of goods from HIPCs. Such preferential treatment should give the poorest countries some incentive to persist with the often difficult and complex set of structural and institutional reforms allied to enhanced debt relief and aid flows.
Fifth, the size of the grant component of the new disbursement was identified by our sensitivity tests as another major determinant of the debt sustainability outlook in post-HIPC-MDRI countries. This finding is related to the fact that the bulk of HIPC external finance has largely comprised official disbursements from bilateral and multilateral agencies directly in loans to their central governments and to corporations which they own or underwrite. Given the limited capacity of HIPC governments to repay debt from fiscal balances, creditors should provide a significant proportion of the projected new transfers in the form of grants and/or on more concessional terms. Indeed, we estimate that at least one-half of all new finance to severely indebted countries, such as Nicaragua, should come in the form of grants-in-aid and/or loans with an average grant element of at least 50 percent. This should ensure that the NPV of external debt stocks relative to exports is reduced below the 150 percent sustainability threshold by the end of 2015. HIPC governments, for their part, should pay more attention to the terms and conditions of new borrowing and should ensure that they put resources freed-up by debt relief to good use. As part of the approach outlined in their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), the HIPC authorities should honour their commitment to channel more of any enhanced debt relief to the provision poverty-reduction initiatives like improved education, health, nutrition, water and sanitation. They should also follow more prudent debt management and accounting policies. This will require the strengthening of their legal and regulatory systems for public debt and expenditure management, as well as the establishment of appropriate debt information systems for recording, retrieving and analysing data on public debt. Such should help to improve their overall domestic borrowing position and to reduce the fear that the exclusion of such public domestic debt from the Enhanced HIPC debt sustainability framework will undermine the effectiveness of the structural adjustment policies allied to debt relief
assistance. An active debt management strategy should also include the training of public sector workers in the preparation and use of a debt sustainability framework to determine the concessionality and appropriateness of new disbursements for the country's overall debt outlook. This should help allay concerns expressed by the sponsors of HIPC and MDRI Programs that they might be cross-subsidizing other lenders, especially newly-emerging bilateral creditors and commercial banks that offer non-concessional loans. But, to prevent such free riding and moral hazard it may be necessary for sanctions to be imposed on those countries that raise non-concessional loans at home or from abroad which breach the concessionality guidelines specified in their PRSPs.
The long-term development objectives embodied in our simulations of foreign debt ratios in this study are optimistic. Thus, while the results reported in this article may be generally plausible as a measure of the magnitude of the stock of external debt liabilities associated with a target growth of five-and-a-half percent in our sixteen post-HIPC-MDRI countries, they are tentative and need to be interpreted with caution. A more comprehensive econometric analysis will be required to establish the relative roles and interactions between domestic and external factors in determining foreign indebtedness, as well as the required responses of the HIPC authorities to
